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Abstract Decision support systems are increasingly being
adopted by various digital platforms. However, prior
research has shown that certain contexts can induce algorithm aversion, leading people to reject their decision
support. This paper investigates how and why the context
in which users are making decisions (for-profit versus
prosocial microlending decisions) affects their degree of
algorithm aversion and ultimately their preference for more
human-like (versus computer-like) decision support systems. The study proposes that contexts vary in their
affordances for self-humanization. Specifically, people
perceive prosocial decisions as more relevant to self-humanization than for-profit contexts, and, in consequence,
they ascribe more importance to empathy and autonomy
while making decisions in prosocial contexts. This
increased importance of empathy and autonomy leads to a
higher degree of algorithm aversion. At the same time, it
also leads to a stronger preference for human-like decision
support, which could therefore serve as a remedy for an
algorithm aversion induced by the need for self-humanization. The results from an online experiment support the
theorizing. The paper discusses both theoretical and design
implications, especially for the potential of anthropomorphized conversational agents on platforms for prosocial
decision-making.
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1 Introduction
Decision support systems are becoming faster, smarter, and
more powerful by the minute, and thus it is for good reason
that they can be found on just about any successful internet
platform in the form of recommendation systems, conversational agents, or interactive decision aids (Aggarwal
2016; Jung et al. 2018; Maedche et al. 2019; Pfeiffer et al.
2014). However, as these decision support systems spread
to more and more domains of life, the question arises as to
what extent users are willing to use them in every context.
Indeed, while algorithms are being rapidly adopted in some
contexts, prior research has shown that people are often
algorithm averse (Castelo et al. 2019; Dietvorst et al. 2015)
and that they might prefer the support of another human
(Dietvorst et al. 2015; Sinha and Swearingen 2001; Yeomans et al. 2019)—for instance, if they perceive a task to
be more subjective and thus requiring intuition as well as
personal interpretation (Castelo et al. 2019; Inbar et al.
2010). In a related stream of research, Seeger et al. (2021)
proposed that some tasks are more human-like, meaning
that the support system is substituting for a human interaction partner and that this might affect users’ expectations
of the system’s design. Overall, given the huge potential of
decision support systems to facilitate and improve decision-making, there is continued interest in the question
about context-specific reasons for algorithm aversion, both
theoretically, as such reasons are closely tied to a deep
understanding of its underlying mechanisms, and
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practically, with an eye toward building context-specific
remedies to overcome this bias.
In this paper, we address this question by building on the
theoretical framework of self-humanization as a particularly suitable conceptual lens for explaining contextual
differences in algorithm aversion. The central tenet of this
framework is that people want to be seen by others, and to
see themselves, as fully human (Haslam et al. 2005). In
order to feel human, people place great importance on
using abilities that have been called human nature attributes. They believe these attributes cannot be shared with
machines—think, for example, of emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, agency, cognitive openness,
and depth (Haslam 2006). The main thesis of this paper is
thus that in decision contexts where people see such human
nature attributes as particularly important, they become
algorithm averse and would prefer to be supported by a
human (as humans have these attributes, but algorithms
cannot possess them (Haslam 2006)). Specifically, we
propose that the underlying reasons that make people
averse to algorithms in contexts they deem relevant for
self-humanization are two facets of self-humanization: the
importance of empathy and autonomy.
In addition to this theoretical contribution, we consider
the practical implications of our research model and propose decision support systems that imitate human-like
characteristics as a remedy for humanization-induced
algorithm aversion. We call such decision support systems
human-like decision support. Imagine anthropomorphized
conversational agents who, using natural language, emulate
human-to-human communication (Maedche et al. 2019;
Schuetzler et al. 2014; Seeger et al. 2021), or consider the
applications of neurophysiological measurements for
making communication between humans and computers
emotionally richer (Picard 2003; Zheng and Lu 2015). Or
contemplate the attempts made to compel black box artificial intelligence algorithms to explain their decisions to
the user (Adadi and Berrada 2018; Barredo Arrieta et al.
2020). Such decision support systems are not only rising in
popularity; they also prompt the user to ascribe human
nature attributes to them.
One decision context for which human nature attributes
are seen as particularly important is that of prosocial
decisions, defined as decisions to benefit others. People
decide to help others in need, volunteer for good causes,
and give money to charities. Prior research has shown that
two factors stemming from these human nature attributes
are particularly relevant for prosocial decisions: empathy
and autonomy. Indeed, rather than trying to rationally find
the option that produces the maximal benefit to others (or,
more generally, the maximal welfare gain) or delegating
their decision to an algorithm that could approximate such
rationality, people often prefer to actively and
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autonomously choose options aligned with their own subjective preferences (Berman et al. 2018). They aim to
select options that feel right (i.e., that give them a warm
glow (Andreoni 1990; Dunn et al. 2014)) and that allow
them to experience empathy with the beneficiary (Galak
et al. 2011; Loewenstein and Small 2007). Despite these
rather peculiar characteristics of the prosocial decision
context, people increasingly use digital platforms to engage
in prosocial behavior (e.g., Galak et al. 2011). To the best
of our knowledge, no previous research has used the lens of
self-humanization to illuminate the context of prosocial
decisions with the aim of exploring how it explains algorithm aversion and developing domain-specific remedies.
From a research design perspective, prosocial decisions
are also a particularly well-suited context for studying selfhumanization and algorithm aversion. One type of prosocial platform, prosocial microlending, has a for-profit
counterpart in the form of regular for-profit microlending
platforms. On both types of platforms, users select entrepreneurs, with the main difference that on one platform, the
users receive no interest payments and follow prosocial
motives (Galak et al. 2011; Haas et al. 2014), whereas on
the other, they want to make money (Haas et al. 2014).
Comparing for-profit with prosocial microlending decisions allows us to change the context (and thereby the
relevance of self-humanization) while keeping most elements of the decision process constant and thus to isolate
the effect of the decision context as thoroughly as possible.
Specifically, in an online experiment, we manipulated the
relevance of self-humanization by randomly assigning
participants to make decisions either on a for-profit or on a
prosocial microlending platform.
Our experiment provides evidence supporting our
research model and thus the hypothesized causal relationship between factors that have rarely been studied together
and are important for understanding contextual differences
in algorithm aversion. We thereby make three main contributions: First, we build on the theoretical lens of selfhumanization to understand how differences between
decision contexts (and with them different types of platforms) affect algorithm aversion. Second, we propose and
test the two main mechanisms of how self-humanization
drives this context-specific algorithm aversion: the importance the user gives to autonomy and the importance the
user gives to empathy. Third, we explore the practical
implications for how this context-specific algorithm aversion can be remedied: by making the decision support
system appear more human-like. This solution obviously
has direct implications for the designers of decision support
systems in different contexts. Creating a decision support
system based on these ideas carries the promise of not only
satisfying users’ desire to feel more human, but also of
reinforcing prosocial behavior. Overall, our results strongly
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support the idea that decision support systems cannot
merely be copied and pasted between contexts, but need to
be thoroughly adapted to users’ preferences and expectations to prevent and overcome algorithm aversion.

2 Theory
2.1 Algorithm Aversion
Algorithms have long been proposed as a means to overcome the cognitive limitations of humans (Burton et al.
2020; Dawes 1979; Meehl 1954). Indeed, several studies in
different contexts have shown that algorithms can and do
outperform humans, for example, in forecasting tasks
(Grove et al. 2000) and supply chain distribution (Validi
et al. 2015). While some form of algorithm appreciation
seems to exist in some domains (Logg et al. 2019; Prahl
and van Swol 2017), in many contexts, people seem to be
intuitively averse to using them, a phenomenon that was
termed ‘‘algorithm aversion’’ by Dietvorst et al. (2015).
One initial focus of this research was users’ high
expectations concerning the performance of algorithms:
they expect them to be perfect. Consequently, people
quickly lose trust in algorithms once they see them err
(Dietvorst et al. 2015, 2018). Of course, predicting the
future perfectly is inherently difficult; thus, even extremely
well-crafted algorithms will err from time to time (Dietvorst et al. 2015; Prahl and van Swol 2017). However,
there are also cases in which people did not observe the
algorithm, thus they could not learn about algorithmic
failures (e.g., Longoni et al. 2019), and yet they still felt
algorithm aversion. Taking the breadth of the phenomenon
into account, we follow Jussupow et al. (2020) and define
algorithm aversion as the ‘‘biased assessment of an algorithm which manifests in negative behaviors and attitudes
towards the algorithm compared to a human agent’’ (p. 4).
Algorithm aversion is an umbrella term, and there are
several different reasons underlying this biased assessment.
In recent literature reviews, these different causes have
been discussed and categorized (see, for example, Burton
et al. (2020) and Jussupow et al. (2020)). Let us give a few
examples: We already mentioned the expectation that an
algorithm should work perfectly (Dietvorst et al.
2015, 2018), which fits into the larger category of users’
beliefs about what an algorithm is capable of, and which
might be driven by a user’s domain-specific expertise—
with experts often showing higher degrees of algorithm
aversion. Relatedly, humans make decisions differently
from the way computers do (cognitive compatibility), for
instance, by using heuristics, which are simple decision
strategies that ignore part of the available information
(Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; Hoffrage et al. 2018). Most of the
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time humans act in a world of uncertainty where not all
possible consequences (and their probabilities) of a decision are known or knowable (Neth and Gigerenzer 2015),
whereas typically algorithms optimize under risk, which
means they implicitly assume that they know all outcomes
and probabilities (divergent rationalities). Moreover, the
category of decision autonomy describes the feeling of
being in control, which could be diminished if one cannot
understand how an algorithm actually makes decisions, or
if one cannot influence and control how an algorithm
makes the decision. As these examples illustrate, there are
many different categories of causes for algorithm aversion;
it comes in many flavors, forms, and functions. Some of
these causes are driven not only by features of the algorithms themselves, but also by features of the context in
which the algorithms are used (Castelo et al. 2019).
2.2 Self-Humanization
One theoretical dimension that seems particularly relevant
for explaining contextual differences in algorithm aversion
stems from the theoretical framework of self-humanization
(Haslam 2006). Haslam et al. (2005) proposed that people
want to be seen by others, and to see themselves, as fully
human—to the point where they see themselves as more
human than others. There are two distinct senses of
humanness that contribute to being seen as fully human
(Haslam 2006). First, uniquely human attributes distinguish humans from animals, although despite being labeled
uniquely human (e.g., cognitive capabilities, like logic, and
rationality), they can be shared with machines. Second, and
more importantly for explaining algorithm aversion, human
nature attributes comprise attributes that people (across
cultures) believe cannot be shared with machines (although
potentially with animals), and thus, by extension, with
algorithms and decision support systems (Haslam et al.
2008; Kahn et al. 2006). In his review paper, Haslam
(2006) proposed five categories of human nature attributes:
emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, agency,
cognitive openness, and depth. Prior research has found
that people assess themselves (relative to others) to more
strongly embody human nature attributes, especially
openness, warmth, and emotionality (Haslam et al. 2005).
Moreover, they also want to see themselves, and be seen by
others, as possessing human nature attributes, which are
perceived as more important and more deeply rooted in the
individual, relative to uniquely human attributes (Bain
et al. 2006; Haslam et al. 2000, 2004).
Contexts differ widely in their relevance, their ability to
be diagnostic, and their affordances for embodying human
nature attributes. For instance, contexts that prompt people
to focus on and prioritize making money have been found
to decrease self-humanization, particularly in terms of
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human nature attributes (e.g., Ruttan and Lucas 2018). In
contrast, prosocial decisions, such as helping a friend in
need or donating to charity, have humanization at their
front and center; the very act of engaging in prosocial
decisions in the first place is unique to human nature.
Making prosocial decisions allows people to embody their
own human nature attributes and, in consequence, to be
seen as and to feel more human.
More generally, following Ruttan and Lucas (2018),
who built on Schwartz’s circumplex model of human goals
and values (Schwartz 1992, 2013), human nature attributes
can be mapped onto self-transcendence values (values that
promote the welfare of others, benevolence, interconnectedness, and emotionality). The fact that these self-transcendent values form an antagonistic relationship with selfenhancement values (values that promote the self, such as
wealth or power) can explain the negative relationship
between money prioritization and human nature attributes.
In other words, different contexts activate different goals
(self-transcendence versus self-enhancement), and selftranscendent goals map onto human nature attributes, while
self-enhancement goals suppress human nature attributes.
We propose that this activation and suppression of human
nature attributes, which stand in fundamental tension with
the use of machines, algorithms, and computerized decision support systems, is a driver of contextual differences
in algorithm aversion.
2.3 Overcoming Algorithm Aversion with Human-like
Decision Support
In sum, the theoretical lens of self-humanization highlights
that in contexts that people deem relevant for their selfhumanization, there is a fundamental tension between
human nature attributes on the one hand and using
machines, algorithms, and computerized decision support
systems on the other. Yet, when it comes to decisions on
digital platforms, the sheer number of possibilities on many
platforms can be overwhelming, and users long for ways to
reduce the decision effort (e.g., Häubl and Trifts 2000). In
principle, this renders the superior capabilities of algorithms to screen and integrate large amounts of information
very attractive. The question arises whether it is possible,
and if so, how, to make algorithm-based decision support
more palatable to decision-makers in contexts in which
they experience self-humanization-driven algorithm
aversion.
The theoretical lens of self-humanization not only
allows for understanding the underlying reasons for algorithm aversion in such contexts but also points to a
potential solution: create the impression that the decision
support is more human-like (and less machine-like). The
intuitive classification of ways to support decisions in
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human-like and computer-like decision support stems from
Seeger et al. (2021) and their concept of human-like versus
computer-like tasks in the context of conversational agents.
Human-like decision tasks are tasks in which a conversational agent is substituted for a human interaction partner
(Lankton et al. 2015). These are tasks that are typical for a
human (Seeger et al. 2021). We adapted the definition of
human-like versus computer-like tasks from Seeger et al.
(2021) and tailored it to decision support systems: humanlike decision support refers to a decision support system
that has characteristics that are typical for a human (e.g.,
possessing human nature attributes). As there is not necessarily a clear separation between these types of decision
support systems, they can be placed on a continuum
(Lankton et al. 2015).
There are multiple ways to dress up a decision support
system to make it come across as more human-like. One
prominent approach relies on anthropomorphization, which
literally means humanizing (Epley et al. 2007), for example, through the use of social cues (Gnewuch et al. 2017;
Seeger et al. 2021). A further way to create more humanlike decision support systems might be to let computers
simulate emotions, which is a burgeoning research area in
computer science (e.g., affective computing). Decision
support systems could try to give the user the impression
that the computer has feelings by letting the computer
detect emotions in both users and loan recipients with
algorithms (Swangnetr and Kaber 2013). For example, the
decision support system could try to infer emotions from
the recipient’s picture (Garcia-Garcia et al. 2017) or from
text using sentiment analysis (Yadollahi et al. 2017), and a
virtual agent might even be able to assume different facial
expressions (Gordon et al. 2019).1
2.4 For-Profit versus Prosocial Decision Contexts
One straightforward operationalization of such contextual
differences in the relevance of human nature attributes is to
compare and contrast for-profit with prosocial decisionmaking contexts. For-profit decisions are defined as decisions people make to make money (e.g., interest payments
from entrepreneurs), whereas prosocial decisions are
defined as decisions that people make for the benefit of
others (Eisenberg and Miller 1987).
We chose the domain of microlending decisions because
there are for-profit and prosocial versions of microlending
platforms, which creates a natural comparison that allows
us to experimentally manipulate the context of a digital
platform as cleanly as possible. Microlending itself is a
relatively new financial instrument for providing
1

For practical examples, see the AI Companion from Luka https://
replika.ai/ or Kuki AI from Pandora https://www.kuki.ai/.
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entrepreneurs with small loans when traditional sources of
financing may be unobtainable for them, for instance, due
to their lack of collateral (Allison et al. 2013; Bruton et al.
2011). Peer-to-peer online platforms feature an emerging
form of microlending that allows individuals to select
entrepreneurs on the basis of the information contained in
investment profiles, for instance, on for-profit microlending
platforms like Prosper, FundedByMe, and Wisefund and on
prosocial platforms like KIVA, GoFundMe, and Lend for
Peace.
Because of for-profit decisions’ strong focus on making
money (Haas et al. 2014), the challenge of decision-making
in such a context amounts to making good inferences about
which loans will likely be paid back on time or even be
paid back at all (Moss et al. 2015). In prosocial
microlending, in contrast, lenders want to help someone in
need (e.g., small business owners in developing countries)
by lending them money interest-free (e.g., Allison et al.
2015; Galak et al. 2011). Prior research has found that in
prosocial contexts, people do not think (or at least they act
as if they do not think) that options can be objectively
ranked (Berman et al. 2018), and thus they believe that
there is no objectively best option that would likely have
the largest positive impact on social welfare overall
(Caviola et al. 2020). Consequently, people prefer to base
their decisions on more subjective factors—which are
typically related to and driven by the abilities of human
nature described above (e.g., their experience of empathy).
Relying on their human nature capability to connect with
the beneficiary in prosocial microlending thus provides an
ideal contrast to the clearly defined criteria that lend
themselves to rational optimization by machines in forprofit microlending (Bruton et al. 2011; Moss et al. 2015).
2.5 Human Nature Attributes, Empathy,
and Autonomy
What are the implications of the particular relevance of
human nature attributes for explaining contextual differences in algorithm aversion? The first factor stemming
from these human nature attributes that is particularly
relevant for prosocial decision-making is empathy, which
is defined as the ability to take the emotional perspective of
someone else—feeling as others—and includes the feeling
of sympathy—feeling for others (Batson 2014; Cuff et al.
2016; Davis 1983; Loewenstein and Small 2007). Emotions in general, and empathy in particular, play a crucial
role when making prosocial decisions (Barasch et al. 2014;
Berman et al. 2018; Caviola et al. 2020). For instance, in
the process of scrutinizing potential recipients of prosocial
lending—that is, browsing through a list of entrepreneurs
in need—people will emotionally react to photos and
individual stories and often ultimately make their decisions
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based on this empathic reaction (Barasch et al. 2014;
Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Herzenstein et al. 2011).
Prompting people to adopt a more deliberative information
processing approach (thus reducing their reliance on
empathy) has been found to lower donations for recipients
(Dickert et al. 2011; Small et al. 2007). Galak et al. (2011)
provided evidence that in prosocial decisions, because
similarity reduces social distance and facilitates empathy,
people spend more money to help those who are more
similar to themselves. More broadly, feelings of empathy
and sympathy (as well as emotions such as fear, guilt,
pity—cf. Sargeant et al. (2006) and regret—Martinez et al.
(2011)) feature prominently among the factors that influence how much people are willing to give (Galak et al.
2011; Hamilton and Sherman 1996; Pavey et al. 2012).
The second factor stemming from these human nature
attributes that is particularly relevant for prosocial decision-making is autonomy. In short, to perceive a decision
as reflecting their human nature attributes, people would
have to be in the driver’s seat, making the decision themselves. Most definitions of autonomy have notions of free
choice and self-determination in common (André et al.
2018; Christman 2020; Deci and Ryan 2000; Ryan and
Connell 1989; Wertenbroch et al. 2020). For example,
Janiesch et al. (2019) posited: ‘‘In general, autonomy
describes an entity’s or agent’s ability to act independently
and self-determined’’ (p. 164). Longstanding research traditions in psychology have established autonomy as a
fundamental human need (Christman 2020; Deci and Ryan
2000). For instance, in self-determination theory (Deci and
Ryan 1985, 2000), the autonomy a person experiences
while engaging in a task is a central driver of the intrinsic
motivation for performing that task.
In for-profit microlending decisions, however, such
autonomy might be less desired, as people have less to gain
from seeing themselves as being good at maximizing
profits than from seeing themselves as being good in terms
of possessing human nature attributes—and ultimately as
good human beings. At the same time, people have more to
lose from having full autonomy (instead of giving up
autonomy to their decision support system) in for-profit
decisions. As people believe that there are objectively right
and wrong choices, selecting the right recipients will allow
them to maximize their profits, while selecting others could
lead to substantial losses and feelings of regret. In consequence, people might be willing to give up autonomy to
others with a higher domain knowledge when they are
pursuing a clear, objective goal in their decisions, as, for
instance, in for-profit microlending. Yet, giving away
autonomy to somebody or something else might undermine
the perception that they personally (and thus autonomously) selected the option and thereby ultimately prevent
the option from feeling right. Just as building a piece of
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furniture with one’s own hands positively affects how
much one likes the furniture (Norton et al. 2012), making a
prosocial decision with one’s own mind might also positively affect how much one feels connected to the recipient.

3 Hypotheses Development
Empathy and autonomy, the two factors whose perceived
importance is shaped by the context, and, specifically, by
contextual differences in terms of the contexts relevance
for self-humanization (as described above), can be easily
mapped onto the five categories of human nature attributes
proposed in Haslam’s (2006) review paper: emotional
responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness,
agency, and depth. First, without empathy, perceiving what
someone else feels is difficult, which closely links empathy
with emotional responsiveness and interpersonal warmth.
Coldness—the antagonist of interpersonal warmth—delimits itself from empathy. Second, without cognitive
openness and agency, decision makers cannot make
autonomous decisions—they are preconditions for autonomy. Third, the last category, depth, can again be linked to
empathy: Without feeling as others feel, how can one
achieve a deep understanding of their situation? It is thus
not surprising that empathy is seen as one of the most
important ways to prevent and overcome dehumanizing
(Halpern and Weinstein 2004). Furthermore, autonomy is
often withdrawn when someone is dehumanized by others
(Haslam 2006), which emphasizes the importance of
autonomy.
Another reason why these two factors, the importance of
empathy and the importance of autonomy, are central for
understanding the contextual differences in the relevance
of human nature attributes is the transcendent, moral, and
altruistic motives such contexts activate (Batson 1990;
Eisenberg and Miller 1987). Moral decisions are often seen
as deeply grounded in emotions (Gray et al. 2017; Haidt
2001) and in empathy in particular (Decety and Cowell
2014; Shaw et al. 1994). Prior research has also emphasized the close relationship between the ability to make
moral judgments and autonomy—the ability to freely
choose actions (Monroe et al. 2017; Nahmias et al. 2014).
3.1 Empathy
The first factor stemming from human nature attributes,
empathy, is by its very nature not an objective criterion, as
different people can have different empathic reactions to
the same potential beneficiary of a prosocial decision (Cuff
et al. 2016). As in previous research (Dickert et al. 2011;
Pavey et al. 2012), we do not use empathy as a measure of
individual differences, capacities, or abilities but rather
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focus on the context-specific importance people grant to
this feeling toward others. People can, in consequence,
perceive this feeling as more or less relevant for making
decisions—which is why it is particularly important for
making prosocial decisions (and generally less important
for making for-profit decisions). Of course, this is not to
say that empathy does not play any role at all in for-profit
microlending decisions. For instance, it might allow decision makers to increase the accuracy of their inferences
about the likelihood of paying back their loans (Moss et al.
2015) if they empathically understand the lenders’ motivations and emotions. However, in general, building on the
idea that prosocial decisions are particularly relevant for
self-humanization, we expect the context of prosocial
microlending, compared to the context of for-profit
microlending, to render decision makers’ feelings of
empathy more important for making decisions.
H1 Users on prosocial microlending platforms place a
higher importance on their empathy with the loan recipients than users on for-profit microlending platforms do.
We expect that the increased importance of empathy for
prosocial microlending decisions (compared to for-profit
microlending decisions) will ultimately translate into
higher levels of algorithm aversion in these contexts, for
three main reasons: First, to the extent that people see their
own capacity to feel emotions and specifically to feel
empathy with the beneficiary as being relevant to making a
decision, they will prefer to receive decision support from
other actors who also have this capacity. Users might
attribute the capacity to feel emotions to other humans but
not to computers, because they might be aware of the fact
that computers cannot have feelings (Kahn et al. 2006).
Additionally, people tend to seek social or parasocial
relationships with the source of advice (Önkal et al. 2009;
Prahl and van Swol 2017), which works much better when
they are getting advice from a human. People do not want
to feel empathy only toward the recipient of their prosocial
loan but also toward the advisor who supports them in the
decision process. However, as empathy is a part of human
nature that cannot be possessed by computers (Castelo
et al. 2019; Haslam 2006), their perceived lack of empathy
for both loan recipients and the platform’s user could drive
the user’s algorithm aversion (Jussupow et al. 2020).
A second reason for increased algorithm aversion is
related to the algorithm aversion’s antecedents of cognitive
incompatibility, divergent rationalities (Burton et al. 2020)
and capability (Jussupow et al. 2020) that we introduced
above. Because empathy is not a capability that is ascribed
to computers (Castelo et al. 2019) and yet is perceived to
be of great importance for prosocial decision tasks, the user
can neither map the algorithm’s decision processes onto the
task requirements nor fully understand and ‘‘translate’’
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them. Relatedly, the importance of empathy (which is hard
to quantify) makes other more objective criteria that might
allow for computing probabilities and inferring objective
rankings become relatively less relevant. For example,
Small et al. (2007) showed that in charity domains, people
base their decisions on affective reactions, which are not
based on objective criteria (see also Slovic et al. 2006). In
sum, decisions based on empathy might appear more
unstructured and adapted to a world of uncertainty (where
expected value calculations are by definition impossible),
which creates a mismatch with algorithmic approaches that
are usually based on the optimization of quantified criteria
(only possible in a world of risk) (Burton et al. 2020). This
mismatch, in turn, leads to algorithm aversion.
Third, research on the transparency of algorithms and
the understandability of artificial intelligence (e.g., Rader
et al. 2018; Shin and Park 2019) has shown that computer
decision aids often appear to people as a black box—
people do not understand how and why the decision aid has
arrived at its recommendation. Especially in situations
where empathy is perceived as important and the users are
skeptical whether computers are capable of empathy, they
will develop questions about how the algorithm works. For
example, they may ask themselves: Does the algorithm
include the personal story in its calculation? Would, or
could, an algorithm incorporate my personal interests?
Because they cannot look into the black box, it becomes
difficult, if not impossible, to judge whether an algorithm is
capable of taking into account or at least approximating
subjective feelings like empathy. If people do not believe
that algorithms can incorporate the importance they place
on empathy, they will not follow the algorithm’s recommendations—they become algorithm averse.
H2 The more important empathy is for users, the higher
their algorithm aversion.
3.2 Autonomy
The second factor stemming from human nature attributes,
autonomy, can be understood in a very general way as the
ability to make a decision freely and in a self-determined
way. While people in general prefer more autonomy over
less autonomy, the importance of autonomy differs across
contexts (Deci and Ryan 2000). The distinction between
giving and giving in, as two types of motivation for
prosocial behavior (Andreoni et al. 2017; Cain et al. 2014;
Dana et al. 2007), further illuminates such differences.
Giving refers to prosocial behavior in which someone
engages with full autonomy, willingly, and in the absence
of any situational pressure. Giving in refers to reluctant
prosocial behavior, in which someone engages, for
instance, in response to concerns about reputation or social
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obligation. When people have the opportunity to avoid a
situation in which they would be compelled to give in, they
usually take it (Cain et al. 2014). Think, for instance, about
a shopping center with two exits, in one of which a
homeless person is sitting and begging for money.
Research has found that more people choose the other exit,
avoiding the situation. At the same time, people voluntarily
sign up for fundraisers, volunteer in soup kitchens, and
browse on prosocial microlending platforms. A key factor
in distinguishing these two types of drivers of prosocial
behavior is people’s perceived autonomy. People want to
freely decide to help others rather than feeling compelled
to do so because only a free, autonomous decision is relevant for self-humanization. They want to feel the warm
glow because they made the decision. The same prosocial
behavior would not feel as fulfilling if people performed it
reluctantly, due to situational pressures.
The feeling that one has to make a loan in for-profit
contexts because the opportunity for profit is too good to
miss out on (i.e., situational pressures) is much less psychologically meaningful than freely and autonomously
wanting to make a loan. Of course, some people enjoy the
feeling of mastering the process of selecting highly profitable loans, but making such decisions autonomously does
not reflect on their degree of self-humanization—of feeling
fully human. Taking these considerations together, we
hypothesize:
H3 Users on prosocial microlending platforms place a
higher importance on their autonomy while making decisions than users on for-profit microlending platforms do.
This context-dependent desire people have to think and
feel that they are making autonomous decisions is easily
undermined when algorithms and decision support systems
come into play (André et al. 2018; Calvo et al. 2020;
Wertenbroch et al. 2020). The mere existence of the ‘‘human in the loop’’ discourse (Parasuraman et al. 2000;
Sirajum Munir et al. 2013) underlines this point, although
often, humans want more than to merely be in the loop. For
instance, autonomy can be undermined by recommendations based on past preferences, which make the opinions
and preferences of the individual persons unnaturally
stable (André et al. 2018), by withholding alternative
information or ill-fitting recommendations (Wertenbroch
et al. 2020), and by interactive decision aids that restrict the
user by adding constraints to the decision process (Pfeiffer
et al. 2014). When people ascribe high importance to
autonomy, they might be even more sensitive to those
restrictions and more or less subtle influences by
algorithms.
Additional evidence for the relationship between
autonomy and algorithm aversion comes from Jussupow
et al. (2020), although they use the related term agency,
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following Komiak and Benbasat (2006). They compared
different types of algorithms, which they term performative
and advisory algorithms. Performative algorithms decide or
act completely autonomously, without a human’s
involvement, leaving to the user only the option to delegate
a task to the algorithm or not. Advisory algorithms follow a
‘‘human-in-the-loop’’ approach: the user always makes the
final decision (see Bonaccio and Dalal 2006), giving them
the autonomy to rely on or to ignore the algorithm’s advice.
Prior research has indeed found that people are more averse
to performative algorithms (Palmeira and Spassova 2015)
and that they consider algorithmic advice more carefully
when it comes from advisory algorithms (Jussupow et al.
2020), supporting the idea that they prefer to keep their
autonomy and dislike losing control to the algorithm
(Burton et al. 2020). In sum, there is a natural tension
between the user’s autonomy and the system’s autonomy.
If users want to use the algorithms and computerized
decision support systems, they have to give at least some
autonomy to them.
At the same time, placing a high importance on autonomy does not lead to an aversion to advice in general to the
same extent that it leads to the more specific aversion to
algorithmic advice. When it comes to decision support,
people face the following conundrum: On the one hand,
decision support could help them manage and extract the
relevant information. This is especially important when
people are pursuing a clear, objective goal by their decisions, such as in for-profit microlending, when they might
select recipients with the best-fitting interest rate. On the
other hand, decision support systems could undermine the
perception that they personally (and thus autonomously)
have selected the option. Algorithmic advice is especially
likely to undermine this perceived autonomy if users see
the algorithm as a black box and thus cannot understand
how the algorithm’s advice was computed or if the
assumed process the algorithm is following differs widely
from the process that users would follow themselves (for
instance, by placing less importance on empathy, as
machines are assumed to be incapable of feeling empathy).
Formally, we state this hypothesis as follows:
H4 The more important autonomy is for the users, the
higher their algorithm aversion.
3.3 Human-like Decision Support as a Remedy
to Dehumanization-induced Algorithm Aversion
When it comes to human advice, people have a much easier
time navigating the conundrum mentioned above and balancing their own autonomy and the autonomy given over to
the other agent. Extensive research on advice taking (and
often advice rejecting, Logg et al. 2019) has demonstrated
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how well people in their social environments are attuned to
navigating and negotiating this conundrum. When interacting with other humans, they can gain much information
through social cues and interpersonal connections (Huang
and Lin 2011; Joinson 2001; Moon 2000) without giving
up independence and autonomy. When dealing with algorithms and computer systems, they may not only lack many
of the social cues that underlie this ability but also lack the
confidence in accepting and rejecting advice that comes
from their extensive experience with human advice givers.
Consequently, letting the user perceive the algorithm more
as a human than a machine (Epley et al. 2007), by letting
the algorithm have or at least imitate human-like characteristics (e.g., emotions), would be a way out of this
conundrum.
As research involving the computers as social actors
paradigm (CASA) has already demonstrated, humans often
show social responses to computers that are comparable to
those they show to humans when interacting with them
(Nass et al. 1994; Nass and Moon 2000). Human-like
decision support taps into this already-existing perception,
building on people’s tendency to seek a social or parasocial
relationship with the source of advice in certain contexts
(Prahl and van Swol 2017). In other words, human-like
decision support aims not only at communicating effectively but also at building a form of human connection to
the user. By clothing the algorithmic decision support in
human likeness, system-designers could ultimately prevent
users from self-dehumanization in contexts in which they
feel a tension between possessing human nature attributes
and using (computerized) decision support systems.
The logic behind our next hypotheses is thus that people
with high algorithm aversion do not want to use algorithms
in a computer-like fashion. However, when algorithms
come across as a more human-like decision support, many
obstacles against algorithms may disappear or at least
become less noticeable. Thus, we formally state the
following:
H5 The higher the users’ algorithm aversion, the more
they prefer human-like decision support.
We have already alluded to the role of autonomy and
empathy in driving people’s algorithm aversion and ultimately in driving their preference for human-like decision
support. Building on that, we expect the type of platform to
have an overall effect on the acceptance of human-like
decision support.
H6 Users prefer more human-like (and less computerlike) decision support on prosocial microlending platforms
than on for-profit microlending platforms.
Figure 1 depicts the theoretical framework that we
develop in this section.
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Fig. 1 Theoretical framework

4 Method
4.1 Independent Variables and Experimental Design
and Procedure
We randomly assigned participants to either a prosocial or
a for-profit microlending condition in a between-subjects
experimental design (see Appendix A for the experimental
stimuli; the appendices are available via http://link.
springer.com). Participants in the prosocial (for-profit)
condition read an explanation of what prosocial (for-profit)
peer-to-peer microlending is and saw three examples of
what projects could look like (see online appendix Figs. 1,
2). Next to a project description and an abstract picture, the
examples contained information on the loan amount, risk
rating, and whether the entrepreneurs had repaid their
former loans on time. In the for-profit condition, the only
additional information shown was the loan’s interest rate.
Because we were not able to derive clear expectations
about effect sizes from prior research, we aimed at a
sample size that would allow us to detect a small effect. At
the same time, we aimed at a sample size large enough to
detect simple mediations in order to be able to gain deeper
insights into the relationships in the research model. To do
so, we relied on the power analysis of Fritz and Mackinnon
(2007), which postulated an effect size from 0.14 in standardized betas for small effects. Such an effect size would
require a sample size of 462 observations to be detected
using a bias-corrected bootstrap with a power of 80%.
We recruited our participants via Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). To ensure that our participants read the

provided examples and introduction carefully, we added
four comprehension questions at the beginning of the
experiment (Goodman et al. 2013). Participants who failed
at these questions were automatically excluded. In total, we
ended up with 615 US-based participants. Each participant
was paid $2 for completing the 15-min experiment. After
we eliminated participants who tried to complete the
experiment multiple times (n = 127), who had already
participated in a pilot test of this experiment (n = 2), whose
origin was not in the US (n = 2), or who made incorrect
statements (e.g., an incorrect worker ID (n = 6), 478 participants remained in the final sample (female 40%, male
58%, other 1%, 1% who chose not to provide gender
information; mean age = 39.88 with SD: 11.12).
4.2 Operationalization of the Dependent Variable
After reading the explanation of the respective experimental conditions, participants answered questions to
measure the dependent and control variables. All items can
be found in Appendix A.
As a manipulation check for our operationalization of
the relevance of self-humanizing (i.e., prosocial versus forprofit context), we used a self-humanization scale based on
human nature attributes from the scale of Ruttan and Lucas
(2018), at the beginning of the questionnaire. A simple
t-test confirms that participants in the prosocial condition
indeed found the prosocial context to be more relevant for
self-humanization (n = 242, mean = 5.2, SD = 0.98) than
participants in the for-profit condition found the for-profit
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics

N = 478

Variable

For-profit condition(N = 236)

Mean

Mean

SD

SD

Relevance of self-humanizing

5.19

0.98

4.39

1.18

Importance of autonomy

5.23

1.00

4.83

1.06

Importance of empathy

4.98

1.13

3.88

1.50

Algorithm aversion

4.52

1.89

4.21

1.96

Preferred human-like decision support

4.40

1.42

3.72

1.49

Age

Mean = 39.88

Table 2 Empirical results
Hypotheses and path

b

SE

P/CI

Supported?

H1 (a1 )

0.87

0.11

\ 0.001

yes

H2 (b1 )

0.28

0.07

\ 0.001

yes

H3 (a2 Þ

0.33

0.09

\ 0.001

yes

H4 (b3 )

0.33

0.08

\ 0.001

yes

Indirect effect (a1  b1 )

0.24

0.07

[0.11; 0.39]

–

Indirect effect (a2  b3 )

0.11

0.04

[0.04; 0.21]

–

H5 (c1 )

0.22

0.03

\ 0.001

yes

H6 (d1 )

0.67

0.13

\ 0.001

yes

The experimental condition was dummy-coded, with 0 = for-profit
and 1 = prosocial. For indirect effects, we used bootstrapped biascorrected confidence intervals (CI) (with 5000 resamples), following
the recommendation of Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008)

context (n = 236, mean = 4.4, SD = 1.18, t (476) = 8.14,
p \ 0.001, d = 0.74).
To measure the importance of empathy, we adopted two
scales from the interpersonal reactivity index from Davis
(1980, 1983). From the two scales-perspective taking and
empathic concern-we created five 7-point Likert items,
which we rephrased to fit our focus on the importance of
empathy.
To measure the importance of autonomy, we developed
a measure based on definitions of autonomy (Christman
2020; Janiesch et al. 2019; Wertenbroch et al. 2020).
Additionally, we consulted the need of autonomy scale and
the scale for autonomous motivation (Deci and Ryan 2000;
Gagné 2003), which we rephrased to fit our focus on the
importance of autonomy.
To measure algorithm aversion, we let our participants
indicate on a 7-point Likert scale whether they would
choose a human supporter or a computerized decision
support. The question is one way to measure algorithm
aversion (Jussupow et al. 2020) using the user’s choice
algorithm aversion measurement and was adopted from
Longoni et al. (2019). We also tried to measure algorithm
aversion with one of the alternative approaches roughly
proposed by Jussupow et al. (2020) that uses the user’s
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Prosocial condition (N = 242)

SD = 11.12

evaluation, including items on trust, appropriateness, and
authenticity. If the algorithm is evaluated less favorably
than the computer on these scales, this would be an indicator of algorithm aversion.
Our scale for human-like decision support is anchored in
the theoretical base of dehumanizing and more precise in
the human nature attributes. We adapted the items from
Ruttan and Lucas (2018) and asked the participants about a
list of human nature attributes that a decision support
system should be capable of.
As controls, we asked participants about their basic
demographics, such as age, gender, and where they currently live. In addition, we added some exploratory questions about the importance of different filters (such as loan
amount left, risk rating, etc.).
As discussed above, there are many different causes of
algorithm aversion. To rule them out as potential confounds, we added several questions to measure them. First,
to measure expectations and expertise, we asked about the
frequency with which users had previously used such a
microlending platform. Second, to gather information
about domain knowledge, we added a single question
regarding experience with computerized decision support.
Third, we added two scales from Bigman and Gray (2018)
about the computer’s experiential capability and the computer’s capability to think, reason, and plan. Fourth, to
measure incentivization through social norms (e.g., information about another user’s application of the algorithm;
see Burton et al. (2020)), we also added a single question
(all questions are listed in Appendix A). We did not control
for three additional categories specified by Jussupow et al.
(2020) and Burton et al. (2020)—performance, social distance, and human involvement—because they are of little
relevance to our context.
For each multi-latent construct, we calculated one
standardized factor based on the associated items. For the
latent constructs, we examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the measurement instruments. The
Cronbach’s alphas and composite reliabilities (CR) were
greater than the suggested threshold of 0.70, and the values
of the average variance extracted (AVE) were above the
suggested minimum of 0.50 (see Table 1 in Appendix B),
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Fig. 2 Empirical model

except for the importance of autonomy scale. All six items
achieved only an AVE of 0.38 and a Cronbach’s alpha of
0.67, which suggested a potential issue with the convergent
validity. A deeper analysis revealed that two questions
loaded poorly on the construct, which was the reason for
the low AVE. After removing these two items (3 and 6), we
achieved an AVE of 0.49, which is in the acceptable range.
Nevertheless, through the removal of these two items,
Cronbach’s alpha declined (0.64), which was expected
because Cronbach’s alpha is also driven by the count of
items that are combined in the measurement scale. In favor
of the higher convergent validity, we decided to base our
analyses on the construct with the two removed items, but
as a robustness check, we verified that the results remained
robust toward testing the hypotheses with the complete
6-item scale.
To test the discriminant validity, we assessed the factor
loadings and cross-loadings (Gefen and Straub 2005). All
of the factors loaded higher on the assigned theoretical
construct than on any other factor. An additional criterion
for establishing discriminant validity demands that the
square root of the AVE be larger than any correlation with
another construct (Fornell and Larcker 1981). This criterion was also satisfied (see Table 1 in Appendix B). We
concluded with the HTMT criterion, which is smaller than
the threshold of 0.85 (Henseler et al. 2015). In sum, we
concluded that our measures exhibited an adequate level of
convergent and discriminant validity.

5 Results
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics, and Table 2,
along with Fig. 2, depicts the results of our statistical
analyses. As Table 1 shows, on the 7-point Likert scale the
participants on average rated higher in the prosocial condition than in the for-profit one.
To test our hypotheses H1–H5, we used the seemingly
unrelated regression (SUREG) framework, as it allowed us
to test our hypotheses while including the control variables
in the model and as it is suitable for using binary independent variables.2 For all analyses, we controlled for age
and gender, and while for testing H2 and H4 (influence on
algorithm aversion), we also controlled for the already
mentioned causes of algorithm aversion: perceived domain
knowledge, experience with computerized decision support, incentivization through social norms, and the perceived capability of a computer. Table 3 in Appendix B
contains more in-depth information on the control variables. The already mentioned Fig. 2 illustrates our empirical model, with the dotted rectangle marking the SUREG
model.
Our results support H1: participants placed a significantly higher importance on their empathy with the loan
recipient in the prosocial experimental condition than in the
for-profit experimental condition (b = 0.87; SE = 0.11;
p \ 0.001). In addition, H2 is supported, which means that
a higher importance of empathy leads to higher algorithm
aversion (b = 0.28; SE = 0.07; p \ 0.001). In other words,
participants in the prosocial condition reported a 0.87
2

All calculations were performed with the software STATA/SE 16.1.
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higher importance of empathy on a 7-point Likert scale,
and with a 1-point increase in this importance, participants
reported a 0.28 higher algorithm aversion.
In addition, H3 is supported by our results: participants
placed a significantly higher importance on their autonomy
while making the decision in the prosocial condition than
while making the decision in the for-profit condition
(b = 0.33; SE = 0.09; p \ 0.001). Furthermore, our model
also supports H4, which means that higher importance of
autonomy (b = 0.33; SE = 0.08; p \ 0.001) leads to higher
algorithm aversion.
To test the relationships postulated in H1 to H4 in detail,
we ran a parallel mediation model, allowing the experimental condition to affect algorithm aversion through two
mediators, empathy and autonomy. We also included the
experimental condition as a direct effect on algorithm
aversion in the model (see path b2 in Fig. 2). This direct
path b2 was not significant (see Table 2: b = 0.11; SE =
0.17; p = 0.57). Both indirect paths are significant (95%
CI of empathy: [0.11; 0.39] and autonomy [0.04; 0.21]).
Because of the significant indirect effects in combination
with the non-significant direct effect, our mediation model
can be classified as an indirect-only model (Zhao et al.
2010), often also described as full mediation.
Finally, yet importantly, our model also estimates the
effect of algorithm aversion on the preference of humanlike decision support. As can be seen in Table 2, the result
is significant (b = 0.22; SE = 0.03; p \ 0.001) and positive, supporting H5.
In order to test our last hypothesis (H6) about the total
effect of the experimental condition on human-like decision support, we estimated a simple OLS. As hypothesized,
in prosocial decisions (compared to for-profit contexts),
human-like support is preferred (b = 0.67; SE = 0.13;
p \ 0.001). In other words, people reported a 0.67-point
higher preference for human-like decision support in the
prosocial condition than in the for-profit condition. In
summary, our model supports all of our hypotheses.
To explore the robustness of our results, we ran the
following three robustness checks, which all followed the
same basis specification outlined in Fig. 2. As a first
robustness check, we estimated our model without any
control variables (results in Table 2 in Appendix B). This
led to consistent results with our model reported above,
with one meaningful difference: the importance of empathy
no longer had a statistically significant effect on algorithm
aversion (b = 0.03; SE = 0.7; p = 0.68, see Table 2). In
consequence, the indirect effect through empathy was also
no longer significant. As algorithm aversion is generally
conceived of as a multi-determined phenomenon, not
adjusting for other known mechanisms (perceived domain
knowledge, experience with computerized decision support, incentivization through social norms, and the
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perceived capability of a computer) might lead to noisy and
biased results (i.e., omitted variables bias). That being said,
future research into the intricacies of the relationship
between algorithm aversion, the importance of empathy,
and the control variables would be needed to illuminate this
discrepancy between the different models more thoroughly.
As a second robustness check, we reran our models
while additionally including the two omitted items from the
importance of autonomy scale. As a third check, we used
the alternative algorithm aversion scale based on the
evaluation instead of the choice. The robustness checks
suggest that our results are robust with regard to these
different specifications and the inclusion of these items.

6 Discussion
Contexts vary in their affordances for self-humanization.
While prosocial contexts are highly relevant for and diagnostic of self-humanization (and human nature attributes in
particular), for-profit contexts, by comparison, suppress
self-humanization goals. In this paper, we theorize that
these differences across contexts lead people to place more
importance on empathy and autonomy in prosocial contexts (compared to for-profit contexts) and thereby ultimately induce context-specific algorithm aversion. Humanlike decision support holds the promise of remedying this
self-humanization-driven algorithm aversion. The results
from our experiment lend support to our hypotheses.
First, our experiment shows that decision contexts
influence the relevance of self-humanizing (self-humanization was higher in the prosocial than in the for-profit
context). The idea that self-humanization is affected by the
decision context of digital platforms is, to the best of our
knowledge, new and has further implications. Understanding the mechanism of self-humanizing might help us
understand what users want from decision support systems
and, therefore, how they should be designed. One potential
direction for future research would be to broaden the scope
of different decision contexts and to investigate the context-specific implications for algorithm aversion and the
type of decision support people prefer. The five categories
of human nature attributes (emotional responsiveness,
interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and
depth) might carry considerable context-specific implications. For example, there might be domains in which
cognitive openness is particularly important for decisions,
potentially connecting to research on computational creativity in artificial intelligence (Bentley and Corne 2002;
Colton et al. 2012). Moreover, while we concentrated on
human nature attributes, uniquely human attributes might
also play an interesting role in the design of decision
support systems. For instance, they might tighten the
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connection between humans and algorithms, because these
attributes can be shared with machines. In particular, when
users consider attributes such as logic and rationality to be
important criteria, algorithm aversion might decrease,
potentially enabling the acceptance of different kinds of
decision support systems.
Second, our experimental results provide further evidence for the idea that empathy is a major factor when it
comes to prosocial behavior, and especially that this is also
the case for prosocial decisions on digital platforms (H1).
We thereby expand on existing research, which has
demonstrated the importance of empathy in (non-digital)
prosocial behavior (Batson et al. 1987; Davis 2015;
Loewenstein and Small 2007; Small and Cryder 2016).
Moreover, our results lend support to the idea that autonomy is particularly important for prosocial behavior (H3),
which is consistent with prior research—for instance, with
the results from Weinstein and Ryan (2010), Gagné (2003),
and Pavey et al. (2012). We can conclude that participants
want not only to feel empathy for a beneficiary, but also to
choose and decide freely in favor of a specific beneficiary.
Third, our experimental results support the proposition
that empathy (H2) and autonomy (H4) lead to higher
algorithm aversion. We thereby contribute to the burgeoning research stream on the antecedents for algorithm
aversion (Burton et al. 2020; Jussupow et al. 2020). In
particular, we find that when empathy is seen as an
important capability for performing a task, humans as
advisors have clear advantages over computers because
feeling empathy is a human nature attribute. This finding is
obviously related to existing causes of algorithm aversion,
such as cognitive incompatibility and divergent rationalities between computers and humans. Furthermore, we find
support for the argument that interacting with a human
instead of a computer might help users control the process
and balance their own autonomy and the autonomy given
to the other agent (human or computer).
Fourth, our results provide evidence that algorithm
aversion has direct implications for the preferred type of
support system. More concretely, a higher algorithm
aversion generates the desire to have more human-like
decision support, which builds on and connects to the work
of Castelo et al. (2019), who already showed that humanlikeness could enhance the use of algorithms in more
subjective tasks, and to the work of Seeger et al. (2021),
who discussed human-like versus computer-like tasks. The
question of how to achieve human-like decision support
remains highly relevant for the field.
Computerized agents might be seen as missing some
human nature attributes, as argued earlier, such as the
ability to experience (moral) authenticity (Bigman and
Gray 2018; Jago 2019) or empathy. Research on humancomputer interaction has already recognized this issue
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(Picard 2003) and points to potential ways to overcome
those deficits—for example, by the use of bio signals like
EEG (Song et al. 2020), eye-tracking (Bradley et al. 2008;
Pfeiffer et al. 2020), or facial expression (Li and Deng
2020), which allows the system to detect the feelings of the
user and thus can take them into account for its suggestions. Another possibility is, as mentioned previously, the
anthropomorphization of the decision support system,
which is also a new and growing research field. An
anthropomorphized conversational agent could emulate
human-to-human communication (e.g., using natural language) (Schuetzler et al. 2014). The use of natural language
is only one of many possibilities of creating more humanlike decision support (Gnewuch et al. 2017). The literature
on anthropomorphized conversational agents suggests different cues (Seeger et al. 2021), such as human identity
cues (e.g., visual representation (Qiu and Benbasat 2009)),
verbal cues (e.g., emotional expressions (de Visser et al.
2016)), context-sensitive responses (Knijnenburg and
Willemsen 2016), and non-verbal cues (e.g., emoticons and
response delays (Gnewuch et al. 2018)). Yet, even without
going to the great length of simulating a complete human
conversation, developing a deeper understanding of how
self-humanization goals drive people to prefer human-like
decision support systems is a fruitful starting point for
designing and fine-tuning various sustainable decision
support systems.
Finally, we show not only that users in prosocial contexts prefer human-like decision support more strongly
than in for-profit contexts, but also that both in prosocial
and for-profit contexts, users value human-like decision
support (t-tests of the means values with the scale average
of 3.5 of the human-like decision support scale support this
finding; prosocial mean = 4.40, SD = 1.42; t(241) = 9.90,
p \ 0.001;
for-profit
mean = 3.72,
SD = 1.50;
t(235) = 2.30, p = 0.01). As described at the very beginning of this paper, human-like decision support is on the
rise, and the observation that these support systems are
preferred in both types of microlending is thus quite
revealing. We have to point out, though, that in both types
of microlending, a human is the receiver of the loan. On
platforms where humans are not ‘‘part’’ of the choice set
from which people choose, for example when the alternatives are share-trading options, we would expect that
human-like attributes might be of less importance.

7 Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research
Our results have implications for both theory and practice.
We contribute to theory by highlighting self-humanizing as
an important theoretical lens for understanding contextual
differences in algorithm aversion. Contexts differ in their

123

288

P. O. Heßler et al.: When Self-Humanization Leads to Algorithm Aversion, Bus Inf Syst Eng 64(3):275–292 (2022)

affordances for self-humanization, and the two mechanisms outlines in our framework—the importance of
empathy and the importance of autonomy—connect these
contextual differences with users’ degree of algorithm
aversion and, ultimately, their preference for human-like
decision support. To the best of our knowledge, autonomy
and empathy have not been considered in parallel before in
the field of digital platforms, although our results indicate
that they should be considered when theorizing about user
behavior on prosocial platforms. They complement other
factors that have often been studied, such as ease of use,
perceived usefulness, and enjoyment (Dwivedi et al. 2015;
Gefen and Straub 2000; Pavalou 2003), and future research
is needed to investigate the interaction between these factors and empathy as well as autonomy.
Our research also has additional practical implications
for designing sustainable decision support systems. At the
current stage of technological development, it would be
possible to create a conversational agent that is able to
fulfill the user’s need for empathy and autonomy while
lowering algorithm aversion through means like anthropomorphizing, the use of facial expressions, and emotion
detection. It is even possible that such a system would not
only help the user with a one-time usage of a platform, but
also reinforce future prosocial actions (Penner 2002) and
thereby increase the overall welfare in the world.
One limitation of the current research is that our
experiment did not use actual users of microlending platforms, but MTurkers as participants, although MTurk
samples might be more representative as student samples
(Chandler et al. 2014). Moreover, several comprehension
checks were implemented in an attempt to prevent concerns about speedy and low-effort responses. Another
limitation is that the usual caveats of using mediation
models for cross-sectional data apply, and we encourage
future research to replicate our results to confirm their
robustness. An ecologically valid field experiment that
moves beyond hypothetical questionnaire responses to
consequential lending decisions would be particularly
desirable.
Yet another limitation lies in our measurement scale for
the importance of autonomy, which could be improved in
terms of convergent validity. All items should be analyzed
carefully, and a new, more extensive and reliable scale
should be developed based on the definition of autonomy.
Finally, our robustness checks suggest that the relationship
between the importance of empathy and algorithm aversion
could be more complicated. Future research should further
explore the interplay between empathy, algorithm aversion,
and its other antecedents proposed by prior research.
The theoretical framework of self-humanization might
provide guidance not only on how to design a decision
support system with attributes that are typical for a human
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(i.e., human-like), but also on other aspects of decision
support—for example, the point of time when the support
is provided. A decision support system that provides support right at the beginning of a decision process might
decrease self-humanization because by restricting user
autonomy early-on, it might not leave the user room to
fully feel as a human. In contrast, a system that steps in
later in the process could give the users the opportunity to
fulfill their self-humanization needs first, for example,
when the users have had the chance to develop emotional
responsiveness to alternatives being decided upon, or to
create a feeling of interpersonal warmth or agency without
being interrupted or undermined by a technical support
system. We propose that future research should investigate
the influence of the point of time of decision support on
self-humanization and its implications for the design of
decision support systems.
There is much research on decision support systems,
such as recommender and interactive decision aids, but
very little on the interplay between those systems and the
decision context in which the user is acting. When and
which type of decision support should we use? How does
the decision context affect the relevance of self-humanization? In turn, how important are different factors to
users, such as their empathy and autonomy, and how
should decision support systems interact with users? As we
believe this paper illustrates, much can be gained by
bridging multiple research fields and by integrating insights
from the psychology into the research field of Information
Systems about why and when people act prosocially and
lend money. The very existence of algorithm aversion
might suggest that many IT artifacts are developed with a
focus not on the human but on rather instrumental objectives, such as economic goals. This focus, while often taken
for granted and not explicitly acknowledged, can lead to
dehumanization (Moore and Piwek 2017). By introducing
self-humanization as a theoretical framework, our paper
highlights the importance of and facilitates the integration
of humanistic values into Information Systems research.
We thus contribute to the recently raised call for a stronger
sociotechnical perspective in Information Systems (e.g.,
made by Sarker et al. (2019).
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mechanical Turk workers: consequences and solutions for
behavioral researchers. Behav Res Methods 46:112–130
Christman J (2020) Autonomy in moral and political philosophy. In:
Metaphysics research lab, Stanford university (ed) the Stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy
Colton S, Wiggins GA, others (2012) Computational creativity: the
final frontier?. In: proceedings of the 20th European conference
on artificial intelligence, Montpellier, pp 21–26
Cuff BM, Brown SJ, Taylor L, Howat DJ (2016) Empathy: a review
of the concept. Emot Rev 8:144–153
Dana J, Weber RA, Kuang JX (2007) Exploiting Moral wiggle room:
experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness.
Econ Theory 33:67–80
Davis MH (1980) A multidimensional approach to individual
differences in empathy. American Psychological Association,
Washington, DC
Davis MH (1983) Measuring individual differences in empathy:
evidence for a multidimensional approach. J Pers Soc Psychol
44:113
Davis MH (2015) Empathy and prosocial behavior. In: Schroeder DA
(ed) The Oxford handbook of prosocial behavior. Oxford Univ.
Press, Oxford
Dawes RM (1979) The Robust beauty of improper linear models in
decision making. Am Psychol 34:571–582
de Visser EJ, Monfort SS, McKendrick R, Smith MAB, McKnight
PE, Krueger F, Parasuraman R (2016) Almost human: anthropomorphism increases trust resilience in cognitive agents. J Exp
Psychol 22:331–349
Decety J, Cowell JM (2014) The Complex relation between morality
and empathy. Trends Cogn Sci 18:337–339
Deci EL, Ryan RM (1985) The General Causality orientations scale:
self-determination in personality. J Res Pers 19:109–134
Deci EL, Ryan RM (2000) The ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘why’’ of goal pursuits:
human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychol Inq
11:227–268
Dickert S, Sagara N, Slovic P (2011) Affective motivations to help
others: a two-stage model of donation decisions. J Behav Decis
Making 24:361–376
Dietvorst BJ, Simmons JP, Massey C (2015) Algorithm aversion:
people erroneously avoid algorithms after seeing them err. J Exp
Psychol Gen 144:114–126
Dietvorst BJ, Simmons JP, Massey C (2018) Overcoming Algorithm
aversion: people will use imperfect algorithms if they can (even
slightly) modify them. Manag Sci 64:1155–1170
Dunn EW, Aknin LB, Norton MI (2014) Prosocial spending and
happiness. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 23:41–47
Dwivedi YK, Wastell D, Laumer S, Henriksen HZ, Myers MD,
Bunker D, Elbanna A, Ravishankar MN, Srivastava SC (2015)
Research on Information Systems failures and successes: status
update and future directions. Inf Syst Front 17:143–157

123

290

P. O. Heßler et al.: When Self-Humanization Leads to Algorithm Aversion, Bus Inf Syst Eng 64(3):275–292 (2022)

Eisenberg N, Miller PA (1987) the relation of empathy to prosocial
and related behaviors. Psychol Bull 101:91–119
Epley N, Waytz A, Cacioppo JT (2007) On Seeing Human: a threefactor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychol Rev 114:864–886
Fornell C, Larcker DF (1981)Evaluating structural equation models
with unobservable variables and measurement error. J Market
Res 18:39–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224378101800104
Fritz MS, Mackinnon DP (2007) Required sample size to detect the
mediated effect. Psychol Sci 18:233–239
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